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HARRY R. BADER"

Not So Helpless: Application of the
U.S. Constitution Property Clause to
Protect Federal Parklands from
External Threats
ABSTRACT
Many conservationists worry that national parkinds may be
threatened by development activities occurring outside established
park boundaries, thereby threatening preservation objectives. Some
legal commentators argue for federal legislation creating buffers
around sensitive parks. Within these buffers, additional federal
regulatory controls would be promulgated to protect park values.
Such statutes are both unnecessary and unwise. Currently, the
extra-territorial reach of the federal constitution's property clause
enables park managers to address external threats to park integrity.
The Property Clause is available, and has been successfully relied
upon, to control activities adjacent to, or within the perimeter area
of, a federal conservation unit which significantly interferes with
the primary purposes for which the federal land is designated.
Buffer legislation also poses a number of technical and predictive
difficulties that may precipitate numerous legal challenges to
management proscriptions under such statutes. Case specific
regulatory remedies avoid many of these pitfalls. Reliance upon
existing legal mechanisms remains the most effective means finr
protecting national parks from external threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent Comment in Ecology Law Quarterly made an interesting

and informative argument supporting the need for legislation creating
buffer strips around national parklands. Such buffer zones wouzld protect
sensitive environmental resources from threats posed by activities
occurring on adjacent private land.1 In justifying a statutory buffer strip
approach, the author, Peter Dykstra, asserts that the National Park Service
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1. See Peter Dykstra, Defining the Motherlode: Yellowstone National Park v. the New World
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is unable to ensure protection of parklands from external threats because
the authority of the federal government to regulate private lands is
questionable.2 If such authority does exist, the Comment maintains, "the
power to regulate lands outside of the national park has not yet been
granted to the National Park Service." This argument discounts the use of
general agency regulations pursuant to the Constitution's Property Clause,"
the National Park Service Organic Act," and the specific statutes creating
each park unit. In so doing, Dykstra neglects significant case law developments concerning the extra-territorial application of the Constitution's
property clause that have taken place during the past twenty years.
The purpose of this article is to advance the position that current
Park Service regulation pursuant to the Property Clause, under contemporary constitutional interpretation, may obviate the need for statutory
buffers around the nation's parklands. Buffer strip legislation for each park
unit would prove an extraordinarily difficult task. Such legislation
necessarily involves complex language, ambiguous definitions, difficult
boundary designations, and contentious public policy balancing that is
inherent in the type of congressional statute discussed in the Comment.6
Section I of this article describes the pertinent case law applying
the Property Clause. Section IMI attempts to divine a cohesive and consistent
theory under the Property Clause for the protection of parklands from
external threats. Section IV applies the rules developed in Section I to the
fact pattern presented in Mr. Dykstra's Comment.
II.

EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE PROPERTY
CLAUSE

Over the past two decades, federal agencies have, under the power
of the property clause, exercised authority to control insecticide spraying,7
hunting,8 mining,9 snow machining,10 camping, and boating' 2 on state and

2. See id. at 304-05.
3. Id. at 322,315.
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
6. The Comment acknowledges these difficulties with statutory drafting for buffer
strips. See Dykstra, supra note 1, at 305-07,313.
7. See United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164,165 (S.D.W. Va. 1986).
8. See United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817,817 (8th Cir. 1977).
9. See United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638,638 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Arbo,
691 F.2d 862,862 (9th Cir. 1982).
10. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240,1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
11. See United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5,5 (9th Cir. 1979).
12. See Stupack-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881, 881 (6th Cir. 1995); Free Enterprise
Canoe Renters Association v. United States, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983).
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private property to prevent interference with federal land management
objectives. In each of these cases, no special authorizing legislation was
necessary from Congress to validate the extra-territorial application of
agency regulations.u
The U.S. Supreme Court laid the foundation for modem Property
Clause case law in Kleppe v. New Mexico, in which the Court ruled that
Congress held plenary authority over federal lands."4 At issue was whether
Congress possessed the authority to pass a statute that protected wild
horses and burros on federal lands in contravention of state estray laws. In
the Wild Horses and Burros Acts Congress declared that free roaming wild
horses and burros were an integral part of the natural ecosystem of public
lands in the United States."6 Congress directed the Bureau of Land
Management and the Forest Service to administer public lands in their
respective jurisdictions in a manner that protected wild horses and burros
and prevented their cruel capture, slaughter, and removal from federal
land. New Mexico challenged the legitimacy of the statute, asserting that
only the state Board of Livestock had authority to regulate strays and
promptly removed 19 unbranded, unclaimed burros from federal property.
Upholding the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
federal government
has a power over its own property analogous to the police
power of the several states, and the extent to which it may go
in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies
of the particular case .... M[The property clause gives Congress
the power over the public lands.. .to protect them from
trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon
which others may obtain rights in them .... In short, Congress
.exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature
over the public domain."

13. See also Ronald F. Frank & John H. Eckhard, Powerof Congress Under the Property
Clauseto Give Extra-territorialEffect to FederalLands Law: Will "Respecting Property" Go The Way
Of "AftingCommerce"?, 15 NAT. RsuacES L. 663 (1983); Louis Touton, Note, The Property
Power, Federalism,and the Equal FootingDoctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1980); G. Coggins,
Protectingthe Wildlife Resources of National Parksfrom External Threats,22 LAND AND WATER L.
REV. 1 (1987); and J.Sax, Helpless Giants:The National Parksand the Regulation of PrivateLands,
75 MICH.L. REV. 239 (1976).
14. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
15. 16 U.S.C. §§1331-40 (1976).
16. The idea that exotic, feral animals could ever be considered a natural part of any
North American ecosystem is an idea rejected by most professional wildlife biologists, but as
we shall see, Congress can do no wrong respecting the federal lands. See generally Kenneth P.
Kitt, Wild Horses and Burros ProtectionAct: A Western Melodrama, 15 ENViRONMENTAL L. 503
(1985).
17. K/eppe, 426 U.S. at 540.
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It is important to note that the federal interest under the Property Clause
was not in the horses and burros themselves, but rather, in the lands on
which the animals were found. The federal government possessed a public
interest in owning lands upon which wild horses and burros grazed
unmolested.18
Since Kieppe, other states, particularly Nevada, have clashed with
the federal government concerning the full consequences of the decision.'
In Nevada v. Watkins,' Nevada challenged a federal decision to place a
nuclear waste disposal facility on federal land in contravention of state
regulatory requirements; while in U.S. v. Nye County,2' the issue was
federal prohibitions against local road construction on federal land. The
courts ruled against Nevada each time, concluding that under the Property
Clause, Congress' power over the public lands is without limitation.
Consequently, Congress may control the use of federal lands, protect the
public from hazards on federal land, and regulate wildlife on public
lands.=
These cases only address threats to federal land management
objectives resulting from state and private conduct occurring upon the
federal lands. The issue soon arose, however, as to whether federal
agencies may use the Property Clause, and their enabling statutes, to
protect public lands from extra-territorial threats. A federal court first
addressed this issue in U.S. v. Brown, just one year after K/eppe.'
Brown was an enterprising Minnesotan hunter who possessed all
lawful hunting permits and stamps for the taking of waterfowl under state
and federal law. Taking care not to make landfall upon the shores of
Voyagers National Park, Mr. Brown skillfully navigated state waters until
he eventually arrived upon a state lake, surrounded by the National Park,
and in the midst of many a duck; much to his pleasure, the chagrin of the
National Park Service, and the surprise of the ducks.'

18. This is an important point because states have primary legal interests in wildlife
management under public trust doctrine unless otherwise pre-empted by federal law. See
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,335-38 (1979).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Nye County, Nev., 920 F. Supp 1108 (D. Nev. 1996);
Esmerelda v. Dep't of Energy, 925 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1991); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545
(D. Nev. 1990).
20. See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1549 (9th Cir 1990).
21. See Nye County, Nev., 920 F. Supp. at 1109.
22. See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1553.
23. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817,819 (1977).
24. There was some debate as to whether the lake was, in fact, state waters. However, the
8th Circuit Court held that the actual status of lake ownership did not affect the outcome of
the decision. Therefore, the opinion assumes, for the sake of argument, that the waters were
under state sovereign jurisdiction. See id. at 821.
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Mr. Brown was convicted of hunting in violation of Park Service
regulations that forbade the possession of firearms and hunting activity
within the perimeters of the park. Brown appealed, arguing that the
Property Clause cannot authorize federal land management regulation to
apply to state property.
In upholding the conviction, the court ruled that the Property
Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits.' Applying this
rule to the facts presented in the case, the court stated that congressional
power over federal lands includes the authority to regulate activities on
non-federal public waters in order to protect wildlife and visitors on the
federal park land.? The court found
hunting on the waters in the park could significantly interfere with the use of the park and the purpose for which it
was established...[b]ecause duck hunting occurs in dose
proximity to adjacent lands, [and] there is potential danger of
unwarranted intrusion on public lands, injury to park users,
and disruption of wildlife migration patterns. 7
The regulations prohibiting hunting within the perimeter of the
park boundaries were valid prescriptions designed to promote the
purposes of national parks. These park purposes, the court determined, are
contained within the Park Service Organic Act of 1916' and extend to all
national parks (including Voyagers) to "[Cionserve the scenery and the
natural, historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."' The court,
relying solely on the Property Clause, required no additional statutory
authorization from Congress to permit the Park Service to regulate conduct
on non-federal property.
The next important case addressing extra-territorial application of
the Property Clause also originated in Minnesota's wilderness waters. It
dealt with provisions of the Boundary Water Canoe Area Wilderness Act.
The act imposed restrictions upon motorized transportation occurring on
state and private property within the boundary perimeter of a designated
wilderness area.' In Minnesota v. Block, the state of Minnesota and the
National Association of Property Owners brought action to invalidate the
statutory provisions which limited motorized boat and snow machine use

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 822.
See id.
Id.
16 US.C § 1 (1994). See Brown, 552 F.2d at 822 n. 7.
Brown, 552 F.2d at 822-823 and n. 7.
Act of Oct. 21,1978, §§ 4,14-16, 92 Stat. 1649.
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on 121,000 acres and 7,000 acres of state and private land respectively. In
this instance, federal lands constituted ninety percent of the area contained
within the wilderness boundaries. The court upheld the statute ruling that
"Congress' power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public
land that would threaten the designated purpose of the federal lands."31
Under the Property Clause, Congress possesses the ability to protect its
lands against interference with their intended purposes, and that unregulated use of motorized boats and snow machines on private land
inholdings would "significantly interfere with the use of the wilderness by
canoeists, hikers, and skiers..."
Almost any state activity, even the most traditional of police
powers endeavors, fall before the Property Clause if the activity poses a
significant impediment to federal land management objectives. In 1986, the
National Park Service sought to prevent the broadcast of insecticides by the
state of West Virginia on state and private property within the perimeter
area of the New River Gorge National River without first seeking an
agency permit.3 Congress established the New River in accordance with
criteria mandated by the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.3 Unlike the
situation in both Brown and Block, the federal government, in this case, was
the minority landowner within the park perimeter. Of the. 63,000 acres
encompassed within the designation, less than ten percent (about 6,000
acres) was federal property. The remaining ninety percent of the land was
in either private or state ownership. The state asserted that under its
general police powers to protect public health, safety, and welfare, the state
was empowered to control black fly infestations without first seeking
federal permission, especially on those properties to which the federal
government held no title.
In rejecting the state's claim, the district court noted that general
federal regulations for the park system as a whole forbid the destruction,
injury, or removal of wildlife unless otherwise permitted. "[Hiowever
pesky or annoying" black flies may be to the human population, black flies
are wildlife for purposes of the regulation and therefore subject to the
ban.' Consequently, the court decided that the state could not move
forward with a spraying program within the designated perimeter until
after the state obtained a federal permit for the activity. The court based its
decision on the Property Clause, noting that conduct outside of federally

31.
32.
33.
34.
(1990).
35.

See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240,1249 (1981).
Id. at 1251.
See United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.W. Va. 1986).
West Virginia National Interest River Conservation Act of 1987,16 U.S.C.
See Moore, 640 F. Supp. at 167.

§§ 460M-15
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owned lands can be regulated by federal agencies if such conduct threatens
the designated purpose of the federal land.36 Because the designated
purpose of national parklands is to protect wildlife from capture, harm, or
death, the spraying program would certainly interfere with the management of the New River Gorge Wild River by killing large numbers of black
flies. Again, specific statutory authority was not necessary to empower the
Park Service to alleviate an external threat posed by state conduct.
Even the most favored of private activities is not free of the extraterritorial reach of the Property Clause. The Ninth Circuit upheld Park
Service authority to regulate mining activity on privately owned lands in
the colorful case of U.S. v. Vogler.' Joe Vogler, renowned in the north
country of Alaska for his founding of the Alaska Independence Party, '
owned a number of private mines within the perimeter of Yukon-Charlie
Rivers National Preserve. The 2.1 million acre preserve is part of more than
120 million acres set aside as national parklands, wilderness areas, and
refuges created by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA).
Park regulations under ANILCA require miners owning property
within federal conservation unit perimeters to file operation plans prior to
beginning mineral extraction and the transport of mining equipment across
federal land. Mr. Vogler, who resented the mere presence of the U.S.
government in Alaska, refused to submit to this permitting process.
Instead, he chose to drive his D-8 Caterpillar tractor through the preserve
until confronted by park rangers. The rangers ordered him to cease
immediately. Vogler peaceably, if reluctantly, complied with the park
rangers' demand. He then filed this court action to enjoin the federal
mining regulations.
The Ninth Circuit, not surprisingly, ruled against Mr. Vogler. The
decision noted that Yukon-Charlie Rivers National Preserve was established under ANILCA to protect the area's natural beauty and ecological
value. The court also took notice from expert testimony that Mr. Vogler's
activity uprooted trees, scraped vegetation away, and left physical scars
upon the landscape that could require up to 100 years to return to their
original condition. 41 These access permit requirements, the opinion

36.

See id. at 166.

37.

United States v. Vogler,859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988).

38. The Alaska Independence Party seeks a referendum on secession for Alaska from the
United States. The party held the office of Governor from 1990 to 1994 under former US.
Secretary of Interior Walter Hicide.

39.

16 U.S.C. § 3101 (1986).

40. See Vogler, 859 F.2d at 641.

41. See id. at 640.
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reasoned, were based upon the Mining in Parks Act' and ANILCA, and
protected the park from injury of the kind that would interfere with the
purposes for which the park was established. Because these statutes were
predicated upon the Property Clause, the regulations are valid. Mr. Vogler
could not proceed to cross federal land, nor resume mining operations,
until such activities had been properly permitted under the appropriate
regulatory process. Disgusted, Vogler refused to continue mining, and,
upon his death, was buried in Canada. His will forbade interment in
Alaska for as long as the American flag waved over the state.
In another mining case, federal regulatory control over dominant,
privately owned, subsurface mineral rights was upheld to protect the
federally owned surface estate on a U.S. Forest Service National Grassland
in North Dakota.' In the Duncan case, the Eighth Circuit found that
"Congress may regulate conduct occurring on or off federal land which
affects federal land."" Relying upon the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
Act," which established the system of National Grasslands, the court said
that the Department of Agriculture is authorized to "make rules as
necessary to regulate the use and occupancy of acquired lands and to
conserve and utilize such lands." This general statute grants "the Forest
Service broad power to regulate Forest System land."47 While the Forest
Service cannot prohibit mineral development of the subsurface, it can
require the holders to submit to a permitting process that allows reasonable
development of the private interests without harming federal conservation
interests on the surface.
Federal ability to reach beyond the confines of public land and
regulate activity on adjacent state and private lands has startled many
states, particularly in the West, where federal lands are extensive. State fear
of the extra-territorial application of the Property Clause may actually
induce cooperation between states and the federal government so as to
avoid litigation by identifying federal interests early in the planning stage.
A successful example of state and federal cooperation in the recognition of
extra-territorial interests held by the federal government is found in the
Alaska wolf predator control plan promulgated by the Alaska Department
of Fish and Game in 1993. The Wolf Management Plan included
provisions for the creation of a buffer strip system around federal National

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Plan.

16 U.S.C. § 1907 (1996).
See Duncan Energy Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 50 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 589.
7 U.S.C. § 1010 (1994).
See Duncan, 50 F.3d at 589.

Id.
See Alaska Admin. Code tit. 5, § 92.125 (1989), Wolf Management Implementation
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Park lands in which no active predator control efforts would be implemented by the state, even on lands owned by the state or by Native
corporations. 4' The state of Alaska voluntarily sought and incorporated
federal input in the development of its wolf control plan through the
National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management. Consequently, the federal government made no
objection to the program that led to the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game trapping wolves on federal lands as well as state lands.s' Had it not
been for the very real possibility of federal intervention under the Property
Clause, the Alaska wolf plan would not have accommodated Park interests
in wolves.'s
III. GENERAL RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF
REGULATIONS TO PRIVATE AND STATE PROPERTY UNDER
THE FEDERAL PROPERTY CLAUSE
When deciding whether it is appropriate for federal agencies to
regulate private and state property to protect federal lands from external
threats, several rules must be developed to determme the availability of the
Property Clause for extra-territorial application. The rules that may be
gleaned from case law can be generalized as relating to three primary
subject areas: (1) the location of lands to be regulated in proximity to
federal land, (2) the purpose which the regulation is to serve, and (3) the
nature of the federal interest to be protected.'
A.

Location of Lands to be Regulated

Private and state lands subject to regulations under statutes
pursuant to the extra-territorial application of the Property Clause must be
within the perimeter area of a designated conservation unit or entirely
surrounded by federal lands under various management agencies. In every
49. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601-29a (1994). Native Corporations are special creations of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and are subject to state sovereignty, unlike Indian
Reservations in the lower 48 states. See Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government v.
Alaska, 522 U.S 520 (1998) (holding that Native corporations created by Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act are not Indian Country).
50. While no litigation ensued to attempt to stop the killing of wolves in Alaska, a
political campaign led by animal welfare and rights groups succeeded in convincing Alaska
Governor Tony Knowles to terminate the predator control program less than two years after

it was begun.
51. The author served as an assistant to Chris Smith, Director of Alaska Department of
Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation-Interior Region.
52. See Harry Bader, PotentialLegal Standardsfor Resolving the RS.2477 Right-of-Way Crisis,
11PACE ENVrL L RE V.485,505-07 (1994).
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case cited for the application of the Clause in the previous discussion, the
lands subject to regulations were either within a particular unit's
perimeter, ' surrounded by federal lands or located beneath a federal
surface estate. ' It is important to limit the application of the Clause in this
fashion to ensure a dose nexus between the affected non-federal land and
the protected federal property. Without a clear and distinct demarcation,
courts would be drawn into a technically difficult process of fact finding to
determine the appropriate "zone of impact" for upholding the reach of the
Clause.
This determination is especially problematic because scientific
disagreement abounds concerning zones of impact, and the nature of
impacts, for a variety of anthropogenic disturbances ranging from
footpaths,5 ' to roadsr to timber harvesting,-% to global warming.59 Indeed,
due to the complexities of ecological interconnectedness and the lack of
definitiveness within the environmental field sciences, the determination
of such a zone would probably be impossible. The definitiveness of the
"inholding rule" provides a major advantage over a statutory buffer
approach because statutes would be unable to accurately define the proper
boundaries for an infinite number of potential anthropogenic disturbances.
Under the "inholders rule" a property owner within federal unit perimeters
falls subject to potential regulation automatically.

53. See United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638,639 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Moore,
640 F. Supp. 164, 165 (S.D.W. Va. 1986); United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 863 (9th Cir.

1982); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240,1244 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lindsey, 595
F.2d 5,6 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817,817 (8th Cir. 1977).
54. See Stupack-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881, 881 (6th Cir. 1995).
55. See Duncan Energy Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 50 F.3d 584,584 (8th Cir. 1995).
56. For descriptions of different scientific findings concerning trail impacts and the zone

of disturbance, see Harry Bader et. aL, US. Fish & Wildlife Serv. and the University of AlaskaFairbanks, Impacts of Recreational Trail Development on a Subarctic Alpine Tundra of Central
Alaska, in PROCEEDINGS: RECREATION IMPACIS IN ALASKAN ECOSYSTEMS, Apr. 1517, 1997; David Cole, Abstract, Experimental Trampling of Vegetation: Relationship between
Trampling Intensity and Vegetation Response, 32 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 203 (1995).
57. See F. Stuart Chapin IT & Gaius Shaver, Changes in Soil Propertiesand Vegetation
Following Disturbance of Alaskan Arctic Tundra, 18 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 605 (1981); Gary
AhIstrand & Charles Racine, Response of an Alaskan Shrub-Tussock Community to Selected All
Terrain Vehicle Use, 25 ARCTIC & ALPINE RESEARCH 142 (1993).

58.

See W. MEEHA,

FISHERIES SOC'Y PUBUCATION 19, INFLUENCES OF FOREST AND

RANGELAND MANAGEMENT ON SALMONID FISHES AND THEIR IABITATS (1991); W. Platts & .
Nelson, Fluctuationsin Trout Populationsand Their Implicationsfor Land-Use Evaluation,8 NORTH
AM. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 333 (1988); Ivars Steinblums et. al, Designing Stable Buffer Stripsfor

Stream Protection,J.FORESTRY 49 (1984).
59. See Richard Lindzen, Some Coolness Concerning Global Warming, 71(3) BULL
AM.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 288 (1990); W. Reifsnyder, A Skeptical Enquirer'sView of the Carbon
Dioxide/ClimateControversy, 47 AGRIC. &FOREST METEOROLOGY 349 (1989).

spring199

THE PROPERTY CLAUSE & FEDERAL PARKLANDS

Another advantage of the "inholding rule" is that it gives
reasonable notice to potentially regulated parties that the application of
agency rules may be extended extra-territorially towards them. As an
inholder, one would rationally expect possible federal regulation; whereas
a statutorily defined buffer strip may surprise a good number of individuals who invested in property under the belief that they were sufficiently
distant from the concerned parkland.' The "inholder" rule places an
absolute limit on the extra-territorial extension of the property clause.61
B. Objective Which the Regulations Serve
Extra-territorial application of the Property Clause requires that the
aim of the agency be to prevent significant interference with the purposes
for which the federal land is managed.62 This limitation on the extension of
the Property Clause can be thought of as the "significant interference" rule.
Significant interference is defined as those activities that frustrate
a federal agency's ability to realize its management purposes on the
affected lands. However, simply making federal tasks more difficult or
adding to administrative costs is not significant. Similarly, frustrating a
preferred management technique, when other effective means of achieving
a federal purpose are also available, does not constitute a significant
interference. Case law sheds some gray light as to what types of situations
may constitute "significant interference."
In U.S. v. Brown, the court ruled that waterfowl hunting upon a
lake within a national park posed a direct danger to the safety of visitors
and could conceivably alter wildlife migration patterns. These potential
consequences associated with hunting significantly interfered with the
purpose of the park, which was to conserve wildlife unimpaired and
provide for the human enjoyment of the parklands' because firearm
discharges disturbed wildlife and put visitors in fear.
Like wildlife viewin& wilderness enjoyment too is an important
purpose for federal land management. In Minnesota v. Block, the Forest

60. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission 505 US. 1003 (1992) (discussing
protection of investment-backed interests).
61. Otherwise, one might argue that the Park Service, in order to prevent air pollution
damage to Joshua Tree National Park, might regulate factories in Los Angeles more than 150

miles distant. While, surely, air pollution should be controlled, it should not be the Park
Service that sets limits on the more than three million property owners of Los Angeles
County.
62.

See, United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817,822 (8th Cir. 1977); Minnesota v. Block, 660

F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D.W. Va.
1986).
63. See Browm, 552 F.2d at 822.
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Service was to maintain a wilderness area. Wilderness areas are managed
to be untrammeled by humans and maintained in primeval character with
a substantially unnoticeable human imprint in order to provide outstanding opportunities for solitude." The unrestricted drone of motorboats and
snow machines would prevent these wilderness purposes from being
realized. 65
Maintenance of ecological integrity and natural populations of
wildlife is also an important purpose of national parks." Therefore, the
destruction of black flies within a designated national river way, which was
a unit of the national park system, significantly interfered with the park
goals to conserve wildlife populations.67 The black flies in U.S. v. Moore are
to be treated no differently than the ducks in U.S. v. Brown, despite the lack
of mega fauna appeal for these rather pesky critters.
The "significant interference" rule serves as another rational
limitation to the extra-territorial application of the Property Clause.
Activity on non-federal lands whose effects are a mere inconvenience to the
managing federal agency cannot be regulated by agency rules under the
Property Clause. To allow a more lenient definition would invite the
possibility of agency harassment against inholders, an activity that may
occasionally occur.'
C. The Nature of the Federal Purposes
The federal purpose that extra-territorial application of the
Property Clause is to protect must be one that is fundamental to the
management of the park unit when viewed in its entirety by considering
existing statutory and regulatory mandates for both the unit and the
agency. Thus, wildlife conservation, wilderness solitude, and preservation
of scenic quality are all fundamental to the mission of national parklands.'
In order to meet these criteria, a federal agency must directly link regulations to language contained in a relevant statute, and cannot create

64. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
65. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1251.
66. See Bicycle Trails Council of Main v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1452 (9th Cir. 1996);
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202,206-207 (6th Cir. 1991).
67. See Moore, 640 F. Supp. at 167.
68. A federal district court recently found that conduct by the National Park Service
towards an inholding within Katmai National Park in Alaska, was tantamount to harassment
See Heirs of Palakia Melgenak v. United States, No. A95-0439 CV (D. Alaska 1997).
69. See generally, Bicycle Trails Council of Marn,82 F.3d 1445; Wilkins v. Department of
the Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993); National Rifle Association v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903
(D.D.C. 1986).
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"fundamental" federal purposes by fiat through the administrative rules
process alone to deal with perceived external threats. 0
The three rules (proximity to federal land, significance of interference, and federal management purpose), when taken together, create a
consistent doctrine that dearly demarcates the limits of the extra-territorial
reach of the Property Clause while allowing sufficient flexibility to
accommodate application to a host of problems without requiring troubling
modifications or case specific exceptions. Of particular importance, the
three rules lend predictability to the types of situations that the Clause will
reach and the probable outcomes of those applications. This air of
predictability is an essential element because it allows a potential litigant
to anticipate whether or not his/her conduct will invoke the Clause and the
likely consequences. Therefore, an individual can conform behavior in
advance to prevent costly surprises and reduce disappointment from
expectations.
Each of the three rules serves as a barrier to the extra-territorial
reach of the Property Clause. If the facts do not meet the strictures of any
one of the rules, then agency regulatory action under the Clause, to control
conduct on non-federal lands, is not available to the national government.
In order for the Property Clause to bestow its enormous extra-territorial
power, each rule must be satisfied. While protecting private and state
interests on non-federal lands, the doctrine also provides the federal
government with a potent tool to guard important environmental values
on federal lands from external threats without requiring additional and
complicated statutory authorization. Federal agencies can regulate and stop
behavior on non-federal land, which poses real potential harm to fundamental uses of federal land. As Camfie/d" long ago pointed out, no one has
the validly held expectation to interfere with the purposes to which federal
lands are put.
IV. APPLICATION OF PROPERTY CLAUSE RULES TO THE NEW
WORLD MINE HYPOTHETICAL
Using the facts as presented in Mr. Dykstra's Comment,2 it
appears that Yellowstone National Park can be adequately protected
without special buffer legislation. Failure of agencies to respond appropri-

70. Craig van Rooyen, Going the Extra Mile for the Forty Mile: A Proposal for ExtraTerritorial Regulation of Mining in Alaska's Longest National Wild and Scenic River (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file at the Dep't of Nat. Resources Mgmt., University of AlaskaFairbanks).
71. See Camfield v United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
72. This article makes no attempt to obtain independent verification of factual
information presented in the Comment.
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ately with the extra-territorial reach of the Property Clause, it would seem,
is more a matter of political consideration than a lack of legal authority.
Buffer strip legislation would provide no additional relief from these same
political pressures unless such legislation contained affirmative duties. The
wisdom of congressionally enacted affirmative prescriptions as to what
constitutes harm to individual national parks is questionable. Such efforts
would intrude into the area of expertise possessed by the Park Service and
would be well outside the scope of congressional competency.
According to the Comment, in a quote attributed to a National
Park Service employee, the New World gold mine, owned by Noranda,
Inc., poses a direct and grievous threat to Yellowstone National Park.' The
mine is located two and a half miles from the park's nearest border, but lies
entirely within the perimeters of the designated Gallatin National Forest
boundaries. The threats cited include the leakage of sulfuric acid from mine
tailings into the local watershed, the translocation of underground wastes
into Yellowstone National Park, and the destruction of wetlands valuable
to wildlife. 74 The Comment notes that all mine activities are scheduled to
occur on private lands.
The fact pattern as presented in the Comment meets the criteria of
applicability under rule one, the "inholding" standard. While the mine is
located outside the perimeter of the national park, it does lie entirely within
lands owned and managed by the National Forest Service. It is important
to recognize that the inholding rule requires only that the subject
nonfederal land lie within the perimeter area of a federally
owned/managed unit, not that the non-federal land must lie within the
particular unit subject to the threat.' New World Mine, under this
definition, lies within the perimeter area of federally owned and managed
lands.
Resolution of the question in rule two, the "significant interference" standard, hinges upon a technical debate as to whether the design of
the mine's operation would indeed precipitate the parade of "terribles"
previously listed. For purposes of argument, let us assume that the design
is indeed inadequate and that park surface and ground waters would
become contaminated. That moves us to the question in rule three, the
"fundamental purpose" standard.

73. See Dykstra, supra note 1, at 302.
74. See id. at 302-03.
75. The implication of this recognition is one that would infer that nearly all non-federal
land in states such as Nevada, (which are dose to 83% federally owned and managed) would
meet the requirements of Rule One. But as was mentioned, this, in and of itself, would be
insufficient to invoke the valid exercise of the extra-territorial reach of the Property Clause.
Rules Two and Three must also be met. For information on the extent of federal land
holdings, see U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, 178 PUBLC LAND STATISMICS 1993 (1994).
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In rule three, the issue is whether the federal purpose that is
significantly interfered with is a fundamental one. Not all uses of federal
lands are fundamental to their management purposes. Many uses may
simply be administrative preferences as part of a current policy. To decide
whether a purpose is fundamental when national parklands are at issue,
one must turn to specific establishing legislation for that particular park
unit. One can also turn to the more general National Park Service Organic
Act, which controls the management of the entire national park system.7 6
Yellowstone National Park is governed by the Organic Act. The act
mandates that the Park Service is to "promote and regulate the use of
national parks by such means and measures as conform to their fundamental purpose which is to conserve the scenery and natural and historic
objects and the wildlife therein... " ' External activity that significantly
interferes with the conservation of wildlife and natural features of
Yellowstone National Park, is dearly within the legitimate reach of the
Property Clause, even when occurring on non-federal land. Contamination
of surface and subsurface waters, which imperils wildlife or hydrologic
features such as hot springs and geysers, certainly qualifies as interfering
with the park's fundamental purposes, as articulated in both establishing
legislation and the Organic Act.
One could also apply the same rules and find that the National
Forest Service, too, possesses the authority to regulate the mine. The Forest
Service has a duty to protect the Absoroka Wilderness Area, which lies
even closer to the mine than does Yellowstone National Park. Indeed, the
effects of the mine (dust, noise, and vegetative removal by large excavation
equipment and trucks) are closely analogous to the significant interference
with wilderness management purposes posed by motorized boats and
snow machines discussed in Minnesota v. Block. If noise from snow
machines is the proper subject of regulation to protect wilderness values,
then protection from the noise and pollution of a huge industrial facility
certainly is. The drone of an occasional motor boat is trivial compared to
the roar of today's strip mines and the heavy equipment they require.

76. Unless specific legislation articulates a clear intention to the contrary, all national
park lands are governed by the criteria established in the Organic Act. See National Rifle
Association v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903,912 (D.D.C. 1986); Robert B. Keiter, PreservingNature
in the NationalParks:Law, Policyand Science in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DENVER UNIV. . REV.
649,675-77 (1997).

77. National Rifle Association, 628 F. Supp. at 909.
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V. CONCLUSION
The three-rule approach to the Property Clause outlined here is
superior to buffer strip legislation. First, this approach immediately
recognizes the power of the federal government to protect sensitive
environmental values on public lands under existing statutory authority
and contemporary constitutional interpretation without having to await
additional congressional legislation.
Second, this is a more focused approach. It requires the federal
government to affirmatively demonstrate a concrete harm from identifiable
conduct on non-federal land that would significantly interfere with
fundamental federal purposes. Thus, this approach prevents agencies from
attempting to regulate conduct on non-federal land that is merely an
irritant or runs counter to an administrative policy currently in vogue.
Third, this approach avoids the technical quagmire of attempting
to predict an infinite number of potential and unforeseeable activities that
may have deleterious consequences. Also, buffer legislation would require
delineating various boundary sizes and shapes for each potential disturbance, an equally daunting task.
Fourth, this approach provides an orderly set of rules which allow

states and individuals the opportunity to anticipate and predict the types
of behavior which will invoke regulation pursuant to the extra-territorial

reach of the Property Clause. This ultimately will reduce potential litigation
by allowing parties to conform their behavior in a fashion that avoids
conflict.
The most significant drawbacks to a property clause approach in
protecting federal lands from external threats is that it relies both upon
agency discretion to create and enforce rules with extra-territorial reach,
and it requires an aggressive litigation strategy on the part of the government. Agencies are generally reticent to commit the former, while
government may lack the necessary funds to ensure the latter.
The Property Clause approach commits the decision as to what
significantly interferes with park management to the Park Service. This
allows the agency with the most expertise to prioritize both its research and
enforcement budgets in the most effective and flexible manner. Buffer strip
legislation would restrict agency discretion and reduce management
flexibility without guaranteeing the necessary administrative resources to
meet additional mandates.
While problems with relying upon the Property Clause and agency
initiative are indeed major, they are not remedied by buffer strip legislation, either. Under a buffer strip approach, agencies must promulgate
regulations implementing the statute. As has been described, this proactive task is even more complex and difficult than unit by unit, case by
case regulatory management. Second, regulations implementing buffer
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strips are only as effective as the resolve to enforce them. Again, this
depends upon the resolve of both agency regulators and government
litigators.
Buffer strip legislation is a well-intentioned attempt to protect our
nation's public land natural heritage from unwise activities on neighboring
non-federal lands. However, such legislation confers little advantage over
reliance upon agency regulatory power now available, while such
legislation introduces considerably more burdensome complexities to the
management milieu.
It is the purpose of this article to note that agencies already possess
the necessary power, and have exercised it, to protect parklands from
external threats. That an agency may elect not to do so in a particular
circumstance, such as the New World Mine, is an indication that perhaps
the activity does not significantly jeopardize federal management purposes
within a national park. Or, it may indicate that the agency has opted to
work with Congress to fashion a specific and limited statutory remedy,
which does not encumber the entire national park system.

